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Abstract 
Human cognitive capacity is unavailable for conscious processing of every amount 
of instructional messages. Aligning an instructional design with learner expertise 
level would allow better use of available working memory capacity in a cognitive 
learning task. Motivating students to learn consciously is also an essential 
determinant of the capacity usage. However, motivational factors are often subject 
to unconscious rather than conscious emotional processing. This review sets out the 
need for further studies to elucidate the role of motivation and unconscious 
processing in the use of cognitive capacity. 
Keywords: cognitive effort, schema construction, expertise level, motivation, 
unconscious processing.   
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Resumen 
La capacidad cognitiva humana no está disponible para el procesamiento consciente 
de cada cantidad de mensajes instructivos. La alineación de un diseño instruccional 
con el nivel de experiencia del principiante permitiría un mejor uso de la capacidad 
disponible de la memoria de trabajo en una tarea de aprendizaje cognitivo. Motivar a 
los estudiantes a aprender conscientemente es también una esencia determinante del 
uso de tal capacidad. Sin embargo, los factores de la motivación son a menudo objeto 
de procesamiento emocional inconsciente más que consciente. Este análisis expone la 
necesidad de realizar más estudios para dilucidar el papel de la motivación y el 
procesamiento inconsciente en el uso de la capacidad cognitiva.  
Palabras clave: esfuerzo cognitivo, esquema de construcción, nivel de experiencia, 
motivación, procesamiento inconscient
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orking memory allows for active combinations of storage and                                
manipulations of verbal and visual elements of information 
(Baddeley, 2012). However, its capacity and duration for these 
activities are limited, processing two to four chunks of novel information for 
no more than a few seconds (Cowan, 2001). The limitations of working 
memory are essential determinants of human (conscious) learning. 
To optimise working memory performance (i.e., neither over- nor under-
loading the capacity for a coherent integration of novel and stored 
information) “Cognitive Load Theory (CLT)” has been widely applied to 
instructional manipulations (Sweller, Van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998). The 
theory chiefly suggests aligning an instructional design with relatively lower 
or higher level of learner expertise (Sweller, Ayres, & Kalyuga, 2011). 
According to researchers (Kalyuga, 2011; Moreno, 2010; Paas, Tuovinen, 
Van Merriënboer, & Darabi, 2005; Schnotz, 2010; Van Merriënboer & 
Sweller, 2005), this alignment should also include motivational factors to 
explain how learners exert the necessary cognitive effort (i.e., the amount of 
cognitive capacity that learners devote to processing additional information 
germane to learning). However, an optimal alignment of an instructional 
design with levels of learners’ expertise and motivation needs further 
clarification on at least two questions: Does the investment of more cognitive 
effort require high motivation? If it does so, is high motivation still conducive 
to learning when available cognitive capacity is low? 
CLT has met with a rather different criticism from Schnotz and 
Kürschner (2007) regarding its account of conscious learning. They argued 
that learning takes place not only consciously, but also unconsciously, and 
not in working memory, but in long-term memory. Furthermore, working 
memory does not necessarily lead to the storage or reformation of 
knowledge in long-term memory. Unless the change happens, human 
learning does not occur. Evidence further suggests that neither a permanent 
nor temporary change in human memory can occur without unconscious 
processing (Kuldas, Ismail, Hashim, & Bakar, 2013). Therefore, to restrict 
human learning to conscious processing prevents seeing the facilitatory or 
inhibitory role of unconscious processing in the allocation of cognitive effort 
(Kuldas, Hashim, Ismail, Samsudin, & Bakar, 2014). To what extent 
W 
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unconscious processing affects the use of working memory is the other issue 
that merits further attention. 
Accordingly, research within the framework of CLT is expected to be 
comprehensive by addressing to at least another two issues: how learner 
motivation is related to the use of working memory and how unconscious 
processing facilitates or inhibits working memory performance. On one 
hand, pursuing the main goal of how to optimise cognitive load, the research 
has mostly neglected an equally important goal of how to motivate learners 
to use the available cognitive capacity (Kuldas, Satyen, Ismail, & Hashim, 
2014). The literature shows that even if cognitive capacity is available, 
learners would exert little or no cognitive effort necessary for better learning 
when they lack motivation. On the other hand, focusing more on conscious 
processing, the research has also left largely unclear the role of unconscious 
processing. Learning and task performance can be facilitated by 
unconsciously constructed and automated knowledge, referred to as 
unconscious learning, mostly inaccessible to conscious awareness and 
control (deliberate and controlled attention) and thus verbally unreportable 
(Kuldas et al., 2013). 
This narrative review presents a critical discussion about some boundaries 
of CLT and explains reasons for conducting further studies on the relation of 
motivation and unconscious processing with the use of working memory. 
Taking this relation into account, CLT would provide a new insight into the 
issue of how to use working memory better. The review falls under three main 
headings whereby respectively covers the three issues: (a) how cognitive load 
can be controlled or manipulated, (b) how the optimisation of cognitive load 
or learners’ working memory performance is facilitated or inhibited by 
unconscious learning processes, including affects and motives; and (d) how 
learners can be stimulated to consciously exert more cognitive effort for better 
learning. 
 
Optimising Learners’ Working Memory Performance: Cognitive Load 
Theory 
 
Better learning as the storage of knowledge structures in long-term memory 
(i.e., the construction of schemata ― cognitive templates that enable learners 
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to classify multiple elements of information into a single element according 
to their applications), requires an optimal use of working memory, which is 
central to CLT (Sweller et al., 2011). The theory aims ‘‘to provide 
guidelines intended to assist in the presentation of information in a manner 
that encourages learner activities that optimise intellectual performance” 
(Sweller et al., 1998, p. 25). CLT concerns instructional control over the 
interaction between the design of verbal (spoken or written text) and visual 
materials (animations, figures, or diagrams), the structure of cognitive 
learning tasks, and learners’ cognitive characteristics. It focuses on the 
development of instructional methods that require less training time and less 
cognitive effort to attain durable and transferable learning outcomes. 
According to CLT, the visual and verbal elements of information are 
essential cognitive loads on working memory. Cognitive load was 
traditionally described as consisting of three separate and additive loads – 
intrinsic, extraneous, and germane. As De Jong (2010) suggested “one might 
say that intrinsic and extraneous cognitive load concern cognitive activities 
that must unavoidably be performed, so they fall under cognitive load; 
germane cognitive load is the space that is left over that the learner can decide 
how to use, so this can be labelled as cognitive effort” (p.113). 
 
Intrinsic Cognitive Load (ICL) 
 
ICL stems from learning tasks that are intrinsically difficult or complex. 
Learning a subject via a large number of verbal and visual elements that are 
highly interacting with one another is more difficult than learning a small 
number of the elements having lower interaction. The interactivity is low 
when a single element is learned in isolation (e.g., learning individual words 
independently of each other), but it is high when the element is learned in 
relation to other elements simultaneously, such as learning concepts or 
procedures (Pollock, Chandler, & Sweller, 2002). ICL also depends on the 
characteristics of information (e.g., abstract and concrete levels of concepts); 
therefore, learning some information can intrinsically be more difficult than 
others, despite having the same level of interactivity and the same numbers 
of elements (Chi, 2005). 
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Whether or not ICL could be manipulated by an instructional design was a 
controversial issue; it was regarded as the fixed nature of a learning task that 
could not be altered at all (Paas, Renkl, & Sweller, 2003) or directly (Sweller 
et al., 1998). On the contrary, Van Merriënboer, Kirschner, and Kester (2003) 
argued that ICL is controllable; a way of the manipulation is to sequence the 
interacting elements in a simple-to-complex order, preventing learners from 
experiencing the full complexity of the interaction at the outset. A similar way 
to reduce ICL is to isolate highly interacting elements (i.e., isolated-interacting 
elements effect) in a task. Pollock et al. (2002) suggested providing learners 
with individual elements, instead of initially presenting with full interaction 
between the elements. Once the individual elements are learned, learners can 
thereafter learn the full interaction. Thus, learners initially learn what 
individual elements are, and subsequently, learn how all the elements interact.  
Another way to decrease ICL, as suggested by Gerjets, Scheiter, and 
Catrambone (2006), is to present learners with (a) molar worked-out examples 
(i.e., directing their attention to problem categories and category-specific 
solution procedures to learn), and (b) efficient modular worked-out examples 
(i.e., directing their attention to an individual problem category and its 
modular solution steps to learn). Both the simple-to-complex approach, 
starting with a few interacting elements (isolating highly interacting elements 
at the outset) and part-whole sequencing, starting with simple content that 
builds up complexity gradually, effectively decrease ICL (Van Merriënboer, 
Kester, & Paas, 2006). However, instructional interventions to manipulate ICL 
can lead to unnecessary use of the available cognitive capacity, leading to 
“extraneous cognitive load” (Van Merriënboer & Sweller, 2005).  
 
Extraneous Cognitive Load (ECL) 
 
An instructional design imposes ECL when it gives rise to modality, 
redundancy, and split-attention effects (Kalyuga, 2012). Simultaneous 
delivery of various textual and pictorial information through only the visual 
channel of working memory results in the modality effect. As for 
simultaneous reception of the same information via separate channels 
(auditory and visual modalities), the redundancy effect occurs (e.g., textual 
descriptions for a diagram that is intelligible in isolation). If a diagram is 
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unintelligible and spatially segregated from textual description, learners 
would pay attention to the description while searching for its corresponding 
part on the diagram, and thus, the split-attention effect takes place. Moreno 
and Mayer (2007) suggested (a) presenting the information codes over 
audio-visual channel to avoid the modality effect; (b) excluding unnecessary 
information to eliminate the redundancy effect; and (c) synchronising the 
audio-visual information in time and space to control the split-attention 
effect. 
In developing an instructional design, ICL and ECL are taken into account 
to prevent the design from imposing an inimical load on working memory. 
However, an equally important goal is to free up cognitive capacity for 
processing information relevant to schema construction, concerning the 
generation of germane cognitive load (Van Merriënboer et al., 2006).  
 
Germane Cognitive Load (GCL) 
 
GCL is associated with the construction of new or alteration of stored 
knowledge structures in long-term memory (Van Merriënboer et al., 2006). 
According to Schnotz and Kürschner (2007), what qualifies an imposed load 
as GCL is the conscious construction of knowledge that requires additional 
cognitive capacity beyond the requirements of the task performance. A 
learning task unavoidably imposes more or less ICL and ECL, which do not 
necessarily result in learning, but occupy extra cognitive capacity. If 
cognitive activities do not go beyond task performance or result in learning, 
GCL would not be different from ICL and ECL. 
Schnotz and Kürschner (2007) asserted that task performance and 
learning are fundamentally different processes; despite the fact that they are 
closely correlated, they operate on different sources of mental 
representations. Task performance operates on the representation of novel 
information in working memory, whereas learning operates on the 
representation of prior knowledge in long-term memory. Working memory 
is, therefore, not the place where learning occurs. “What does take place in 
working memory is information processing as part of the learning task 
performance (such as, for example, comprehending texts, solving equations, 
or proving theorems), which trigger with some likelihood changes in long-
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term memory” (p. 492). However, the suggested difference between task 
performance and learning to distinguish between ICL, ECL, and GCL needs 
further evidence. 
 
How to Distinguish between Intrinsic, Extraneous, and Germane 
Cognitive Load 
 
Moreno and Mayer (2007) posited that GCL and ICL occur in the same way, 
in which less experienced learners start selecting, organising, and integrating 
words and images with existing knowledge structures. They hereby engage 
in “essential processing” and “generative processing” to learn. The former 
refers to mentally selecting new information, while the latter refers to 
mentally organising novel information into coherent schemata and 
integrating with prior ones. Thus, like GCL, ICL is contributory to learning 
(De Jong, 2010).  
Kalyuga (2011) suggested considering GCL as equal to ICL, and stated 
that GCL is not based on specific empirical evidence, whereas ICL is. 
According to Sweller (2010), GCL can be used to emphasise the amount of 
working memory resources that learners devote to dealing with ICL. Thus, 
the present formulation of cognitive load only consists of additive ICL and 
ECL rather than ICL, ECL, and GCL. Hence, a direct measurement should 
be developed to differentiate between only the two (Kalyuga, 2011; Sweller, 
2010). 
A traditional way to distinguish between the two types of load is to 
consider levels of prior domain-specific knowledge of learners. In other 
words, the effectiveness of an instructional design to manipulate ICL and 
ECL varies according to the expertise levels (i.e., the expertise reversal 
effect), implying that “instructional techniques that are highly effective with 
inexperienced learners can lose their effectiveness and even have negative 
consequences when used with more experienced learners” (Kalyuga, Ayres, 
Chandler, & Sweller, 2003, p. 23). For instance, a spatially integrated design 
that provides necessary information for less experienced learners to learn 
better may contain unnecessary information that is intelligible in isolation 
for more experienced learners, thereby yielding extraneous load and interfere 
with their cognitive-task performance (Kalyuga, 2007). In such cases, high 
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expertise learners inevitably hold mental representations of redundant 
information (i.e., representational holding process), thereby wasting their 
time and available cognitive capacity (Moreno & Mayer, 2007). Thus, an 
instructional design that takes the expertise reversal effect into account 
would allow learners of all expertise levels to devote their cognitive 
resources to the construction of schemata. 
 
The Construction and Automation of Schemata 
 
“Whereas there are severe capacity limits to the amount of information from 
sensory memory that working memory can process, there are no known 
limits to the amount of information from long-term memory that can be 
processed by working memory” (Sweller, 2004, p. 13). This limitation of 
working memory is hereby less likely to impede processing various elements 
of information that are organised into coherent schemata, which are already 
structured, encoded, classified, and rehearsed information codes with 
common features in long-term memory (Van Merriënboer & Sweller, 2005). 
Therefore, as Sweller et al. (1998) suggested, an instructional design should 
be aimed at facilitating conscious/mental combinations of visual and verbal 
instructional messages of a cognitive task into related schemata, which can 
later become automated as repeatedly and successfully being applied to the 
task. 
“As is the case for schema construction, automation can free working 
memory capacity for other activities because an automated schema directly 
steers behaviour, without the need to be consciously processed in working 
memory” (Van Merriënboer & Sweller, 2005, p. 6). Therefore, once schemata 
have been automated, learners will exert very little conscious effort to operate 
them (Van Gog, Ericsson, Rikers, & Paas, 2005). With the help of automated 
schemata (unconscious processing), “human cognitive architecture handles 
complex material that appears to exceed the capacity of working memory” 
(Paas et al., 2003, p. 2). 
An instructional intervention can facilitate the construction and automation 
of schemata as long as it is aligned with the expertise level. Otherwise the 
learning would be impeded, such as by asking low expertise learners to 
imagine the content of worked-out examples (Kalyuga, 2007). A way of 
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helping the learners is to present them with spatially combined rather than 
segregated instructional messages, but this combination may have little or no 
contribution for more expert learners (Kalyuga et al., 2003). Leung, Low, and 
Sweller (1997) reported that supplementing a mathematical equation with an 
elaborated text did not improve the learning for learners who had sufficient 
knowledge because the equation was intelligible to them. As learners increase 
the knowledge necessary for a learning task, the advantages of integrating 
verbal explanations with visual illustrations disappear. In this stage, they learn 
better through only visual presentations (Leahy, Chandler, & Sweller, 2003). 
The visual rather than verbal processing facilitates the construction of mental 
representations, thereby easing the construction and automation of schemata 
for learners at all levels of expertise (Kalyuga, 2012). 
An instructional design that presents different modes of the same 
information (e.g., an animation and its textual explanation) over both visual 
and auditory modalities is less likely to impose high load as compared to 
only visual modality. Such a design can be beneficial for low expertise 
learners, who can learn better from the visual mode accompanied by a 
corresponding explanation as narration rather than as written text (Moreno & 
Mayer, 2007). The presentation of static visual materials simultaneously 
with corresponding textual or oral explanations in a conventional learning 
environment (Sweller et al., 1998), while replacing the written explanation 
(on-screen text)  with spoken text to describe the dynamic visual material in 
a multimedia learning environment can reduce high cognitive load, facilitate 
imagining the content of instruction (Tindall-Ford & Sweller, 2006), and 
minimise the split-attention effect (Kalyuga, 2012; Moreno & Mayer, 2007). 
Such advantages of spoken text over written text can disappear when (a) an 
auditory instruction contains longer segments (Leahy & Sweller, 2011); (b) a 
narration is without its pictorial presentation; (c) a pictorial presentation is 
too unintelligible or is too intelligibly simple, not needing the narration; and 
(d) when spoken and written texts are concurrently presented (Kalyuga, 
2012). 
As a result, these suggestions for schema construction also emphasise 
how automated conscious knowledge facilitates working memory 
performance. Given that the automated schemata helps the conscious 
processing of novel information, conscious learning happens partially 
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unconsciously. As such, how can one distinguish between conscious and 
unconscious learning? The following sections serve to clarify this question 
and also explain how working memory performance is facilitated or 
inhibited by unconscious learning processes (i.e., encoding, storage, and 
retrieval information mostly without deliberate and controlled attention and 
largely inaccessible to verbal report). 
 
Unconscious Learning Processes 
 
Cognitive load theory claims validity for conscious construction of the kinds 
of knowledge, such as reading, writing, and arithmetic, which have to be 
explicitly taught (Schnotz & Kürschner, 2007). However, as Paas et al. 
(2003) highlighted, working memory, in which all conscious cognitive 
processing occurs, can handle only two or three novel interacting elements. 
“This number is far below the number of interacting elements that occurs in 
most substantive areas of human intellectual activity” (p. 2).  
The human cognitive system is capable of storing more information in 
long-term memory through its unconscious channel than the conscious 
(Lewicki, Czyzewska, & Hoffman, 1987). The unconscious system is 
structurally and functionally much more sophisticated than the conscious 
(Bargh & Morsella, 2008). Lewicki et al. (1987) remarked that the 
unconscious system “releases the controlled processing from the 
responsibility of dealing with numerous tasks supporting every act of 
consciously controlled cognition” (p. 529), such as speech production, 
recognising shapes and locations of objects in three-dimensional space, or 
forming first impressions of a social stimulus. Furthermore, unconsciously 
learned information automatically primes appropriate responses to relevant 
stimuli, thereby operating on more information than could be operated 
consciously. This function is a general property of the human cognitive 
system (Lewicki et al., 1987).  
Therefore, as Schnotz and Kürschner (2007) suggested, conscious 
processing should not be reckoned as the only prerequisite for learning. A 
growing body of literature suggests that the acquisition and application of 
knowledge is not solely a consciously goal-directed cognitive process; it is 
not merely subject to conscious awareness, conscious effort, conscious 
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control, or consciously acquired knowledge (Kuldas, Bakar, & Ismail, 2012). 
Extant studies (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001; 
Custers & Aarts, 2010; Scott & Dienes, 2010) suggest that learners can 
unconsciously form, retain, recall, and apply a goal-directed activity (e.g., 
decision-making) and create the same outcome as can be done consciously. 
This is because, as Bargh and Morsella (2008) acknowledged, an 
unconscious goal-directed process is not less deliberate, controlling, and 
adaptive than the conscious one. 
Knowledge can be unconscious in the sense that learners are neither 
aware of how they acquire and learn it, nor aware of how the unconsciously 
acquired knowledge facilitates their cognitive-task performance (Lewicki et 
al., 1987). Dienes and Berry (1997) concluded from their review that 
learners can unconsciously learn to perform well in a task when their 
attention is focused on specific items and not on the underlying rules. For 
example, before having formal education, most learners have already 
unconscious knowledge about how to speak and how to listen without 
explicit instruction on semantic and syntactic rules of their first language. 
Such knowledge, referred to as biologically primary knowledge, lays 
foundations for the construction of biologically secondary knowledge, such 
as learning how to write and to read (Geary, 2002). The former is 
procedural, mostly acquired unintentionally and not easily verbalised, unlike 
the latter, which is declarative, intentional and easily expressible. Dienes and 
Berry (1997) further stressed that that knowledge used for task performance 
can be regarded as inaccessible to conscious introspection or to conscious 
awareness only in the sense that learners are unable to articulate freely how 
and what they learn. Thus, asking learners to articulate how they acquired 
and applied knowledge, and whether or not they intentionally used it for task 
demands, can be of the ways to determine whether the knowledge is 
conscious and unconscious. 
Empirical evidence indicates that knowledge construction takes place 
mostly in unconscious perceptual (sensory information-processing), 
cognitive (e.g., associative memory networks), and emotional functions, 
which can later be accessible to conscious awareness (Kuldas et al., 2013). 
However, whether unconscious information processing is primarily an 
emotional, perceptual, or cognitive phenomenon is a highly controversial 
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issue (Kihlstrom, Barnhardt, & Tataryn, 1992). This controversy might be a 
reason for referring to unconscious processing under various terms, such as 
automatic, experiential, implicit, intuitive, adoptive unconscious, heuristic, 
associative, psychological, or non-conscious (Kuldas et al., 2013). Another 
reference to associative networks of neural activities of the brain is made; 
the activities form associations within and between information patterns at 
the outset of information processing, and subsequently, affect their retrieval 
processes (Sohn et al., 2005). A further reference to perceptual information-
processing is made, suggesting an unconscious perceptual defence, 
unconsciously suppressing or even blocking sensory information that is 
undesirable (Erdelyi, 1974). The suppression of information may also be due 
to the limited capacity of visual-sensory processing, which does not allow 
for encoding multiple visual information simultaneously and consciously, 
and therefore, has to unconsciously suppress some of the messages to encode 
those messages that can be represented in the conscious mind (Kastner & 
Ungerleider, 2000).  
However these various references to unconscious processing are made 
(i.e., as automatic, experiential, implicit, intuitive, adoptive, heuristic, 
associative, psychological, nonconscious, perceptual defence, or 
suppression), the consensus is that the bulk of perceptual, cognitive, and 
emotional processing, including their interconnections, is inaccessible to 
conscious awareness and thus to verbal report (Kuldas et al., 2014a). A 
convincing reason for the distinctive references may be that the unconscious 
perceptual, cognitive, emotional and motivational functions cannot be easily 
referred to a single heading (i.e., the unconscious mind); instead, the term 
“unconscious processes” may be used (Westen, 1998). The unconscious 
processes can be either inhibitory or facilitatory to learners’ conscious 
thoughts and acts in a classroom setting. An association between conscious 
and unconscious processing (e.g., forming and retrieving thoughts) is of 
elementary associative learning processes. A conscious goal-directed activity 
is accompanied with unconscious associative “memory networks”, such as 
beliefs, wishes, desires, and thoughts, which are linked with “unconscious 
procedures”, such as emotions, motives, and defences (Westen, 1998). These 
unconscious networks and procedures guide human behaviour by activating 
associated memories and affecting emotional states, flows of thoughts, and 
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behavioural tendencies (Kuldas et al., 2013). This activation brings the 
emotional and motivational influence of past experiences into present 
experiences (Schacter, 1992; Westen, 1998). Activated expectations, desires, or 
fears motivate or demotivate learners investing the necessary cognitive effort 
(i.e., facilitating or inhibiting conscious learning processes). 
 
The Effect of Unconscious Emotional Processing on the Use of Working 
Memory 
 
“Affect acts as the on/off switch to motivation, which is the process by which 
goal-directed behavior is initiated and sustained either consciously or 
unconsciously” (Moreno, 2010, p. 137). Affect/motivation determines how 
learners perceive a cognitive learning task in terms of the amount of cognitive 
effort needed to deal with it (Schnotz & Kürschner, 2007). However, most 
parts of the affective/motivational processes can be formed and activated 
unconsciously, thus, resulting in the unconscious evaluation of perceived 
information and unconscious behaviour (Bargh & Morsella, 2008).  
Through the limited conscious capacity, learners cannot promptly 
interfere with the preliminary unconscious evaluation of emotional 
experiences, with the unconscious influence concerning how they perceive 
information, acquire memories, feel, think, behave, and learn (Bargh & 
Morsella, 2008). Experiencing intense negative emotions, such as panic, 
insecurity, or anxiety, and related thoughts (e.g., feeling incompetent) can 
inhibit effective learning, whereas other negative emotions, such as mild 
anxiety, and positive emotions, such as curiosity, can facilitate learning 
activities (Kuyper, Van Der Werf, & Lubber, 2000). Due to the preliminary 
evaluation, humans unconsciously tend to approach emotionally desirable 
experiences that interfere with conscious processing (Epstein, 1994).  
Although learners can later become aware of and evaluate their 
unconsciously initiated behaviour, this conscious evaluation does not mean 
that they are fully aware of emotional/motivational influences, such as urges, 
desires, or fears, nor does it indicate that they have complete conscious 
knowledge of why they are doing what they are doing. They can still be 
unaware the causal origins of their behaviour, of the behaviour itself, and of 
the inﬂuence of such behaviour on their positive and negative evaluations 
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(Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 2006). Feelings, impressions, or prior 
beliefs can still unconsciously influence a typical cognitive task, such as 
reasoning and problem solving (Evans, 2003). Such factors can be 
uncontrollable; an unwanted thought can easily exceed one’s conscious 
control and influence one’s behaviour, such as, inhibiting learning and 
performance of a problem-solving task or mediating inferences and giving 
rise to inaccurate judgements or decisions (Efklides, 2006). Given such 
inhibitory effects, working memory seems to be occupied with emotional 
cognitive load (i.e., thoughts related or evoked by negative emotions). As 
such, further research is needed to provide insight into how the emotional 
load is related to the intrinsic and extraneous load. 
As a result, the unconscious emotional/motivational processing can 
precede the arrival of its counterpart and determine the amount of cognitive 
effort to invest in a learning task. Hence, only focusing on the conscious 
processing capacity can deprive both educators and learners of the 
contribution of unconscious processing. Disregarding the 
affective/motivational processing limits the understanding of how human 
learning occurs. However, the question of how an effective educational 
implication of unconscious learning processes can be designed has yet to be 
tested (Kuldas et al., 2013). Such a test requires differentiating between 
conscious and unconscious motivation for cognitive resource expenditure, so 
as to explain how an instructional intervention must be tailored to meet 
learners’ needs for motivation. As Sweller et al. (2011) emphasised, better 
learning (schema construction) depends on whether or not an instructional 
intervention stimulates learners to consciously allocate the necessary 
cognitive effort. An instructional design must allow students to be 
consciously aware of their motives and thus to avoid the inhibitory effects of 
unconscious emotional processing (i.e., engaging in thoughts or retrieving 
past experiences associated with negative emotional states). 
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Tailoring an Instructional Intervention to Learners’ needs for 
Motivation 
 
Schnotz (2010) remarked that an instructional manipulation alone is not 
stimulating enough for the allocation of the necessary cognitive effort. To 
encourage learners of all expertise levels to exert the effort, an instructional 
guidance, aid, or design should be tailored not just to suit learner expertise 
level, but also to meet their motivational needs (Schnotz & Kürschner, 
2007), such as the need for an optimal challenge level of task difficulty. If 
learners perceive a learning task as too difficult or too easy, they are 
discouraged to persist to learn (Paas et al., 2005). For instance, when low 
expertise learners are provided with a multimedia presentation of a cognitive 
task without onscreen text, they perceive the task as complicated and 
frustrating and thus reduce persistence in dealing with it (i.e., low motivation 
for the use of available capacity in working memory); in contrast, relatively 
experienced learners consider the task challenging (i.e., high motivation for 
the use of capacity), thereby investing more cognitive effort and increasing 
their persistency (Schnotz, Fries, & Horz, 2009). 
To encourage low expertise learners to devote the effort to germane 
learning processes, such as engaging in learning a complex mathematical 
optimisation algorithm, Paas et al. (2005) suggested presenting an animation 
and its textual explanation onscreen to describe the learning task, but the 
difficulty level should be challenging. An unchallenging task is inhibitory 
(i.e., generating low motivation) rather than facilitatory to learning. In 
Schnotz and Rasch’s (2005) study, animated pictures impaired the learning 
processes of low expertise learners because the animation made the task too 
easy (i.e., decreased the motivation, thereby decreasing cognitive effort 
expenditure). Low expertise learners spent less cognitive effort to learn from 
the animation. Nevertheless, the learners performed their task (learning 
date/time differences and the earth’s rotation around its axis) better with the 
help of animated rather than static pictures. Thus, as predicted, low expertise 
learners usually invest less cognitive effort to learn via animation generating 
low motivation (Cooper, Tindall-Ford, Chandler, & Sweller, 2001). 
In addition, instead of making a learning task easier, educators should 
decrease their support and allow learners to learn or perform the task on their 
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own (Schnotz & Kürschner, 2007). In a series of studies (Kalyuga, Chandler, 
& Sweller, 2001; Kalyuga, Chandler, Tuovinen, & Sweller, 2001), learners 
with low expertise were allowed to practice worked-out examples and 
thereafter perform a difficult task; they hereby learned from the examples 
and performed the task better (i.e., high motivation leading to the investment 
of more cognitive effort). In contrast, high expertise learners were allowed to 
explore the same task on their own; they hereby learned most from the 
exploration and performed the task better than after practising the examples. 
Cooper et al. (2001) demonstrated that cognitive-task performance was 
facilitated by allowing low expertise learners to understand and remember 
the task related procedures and concepts through worked-out examples, 
while encouraging high expertise learners to do so on their own by 
imagining, referred to as the imagination effect. Leahy and Sweller (2005) 
reported that low expertise students’ learning of a procedure (learning to use 
a bus timetable) was facilitated through worked-examples rather than 
imagination, however, this result reversed when their expertise increased.  
To both high and low expertise learners, worked-out examples can be 
substantially beneficial, if they are stimulated to give explanations (i.e., the 
self-explanation effect) about what steps are needed to solve a problem and to 
establish a rationale for the problem-solving steps. In particular, stimulating 
high expertise learners to deliberately engage in learning-practice activities 
can improve their learning performance, referred to as the deliberate practice 
effect (Van Gog et al., 2005). However, Renkl (1997) argued that merely 
studying the worked-examples does not suffice to promote schema 
construction because it does not assure learners of avoiding misunderstanding. 
Furthermore, learners are not always able to identify how the examples are 
relevant to corresponding learning tasks or how to use the same problem-
solving steps to deal with new problems. A rather different stance is taken by 
Schnotz and colleagues (2009), who argued that the examples are not 
motivational enough, even perceived as dull and unchallenging. To clarify the 
reasons for the different effects of worked-out examples on low and high 
expertise learners, Moreno (2006) stressed the need for further explanation on 
the relationship between motivational factors and the allocation of the 
necessary cognitive effort. 
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The Relation of Motivational Factors with the Allocation of Cognitive 
Effort 
 
A commonly accepted view about human learning is that learners do not 
spontaneously engage in germane learning processes. The cognitive 
engagement is encouraged or discouraged by motivational factors, such as 
anxiety, probability of success, interest, and challenge, that activate, energise, 
and direct human behaviour (Kuldas et al., 2014b). Motivational factors, 
particularly goals, interests, and beliefs of learners determine whether or not 
they devote the necessary cognitive effort. For instance, unlike learners with 
low interest, those with high interest in a learning task would increase their 
cognitive effort to deal with the task (Hidi & Renninger, 2006). Paas et al. 
(2005) reported that when the motivation was lower, less cognitive effort was 
invested, thus indicating lower cognitive performance; but when the 
motivation was higher, more cognitive resources were invested, resulting in 
higher cognitive performance. 
Learner interest level is increased or decreased by their belief in their own 
competence to complete tasks (Moreno & Mayer 2007). If learners do not 
believe they can perform a cognitive task successfully, they would not invest 
the necessary cognitive effort (Weiner, 2000). In contrast, they would invest 
the effort if they believe they can, and would, thus, perform better than those 
with low or no belief in their success (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000).  
Learners’ interests can vary according to their achievement goals, such as: 
(a) “mastery-approach goal” to improve learning or attain competence in a 
learning task; (b) “mastery-avoidance goal” in order not to fall short of task 
mastery (avoiding skill decline, loss of existing knowledge, or learning 
failures); (c) “performance-approach goal” to outperform others or 
demonstrate competence; and (d) “performance-avoidance goal” in order not 
to appear incompetent or not to do worse than others (Elliot & Thrash, 2001). 
When the goal is to increase competence on a task, learners devote greater 
effort to learn. On the contrary, they devote less cognitive effort, if the goal is 
solely to demonstrate task competence (Ford, Smith, Weissbein, Gully, & 
Salas, 1998). 
The amount of cognitive resource investment is a waste or necessity for 
an achievement goal, depending on learners’ evaluation of costs of time and 
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cognitive effort (Kuldas et al., 2014b). Learners would invest more cognitive 
resource if they believe it is necessary (Paas et al., 2005). Yet, as Schnotz 
(2010) highlighted, the evaluation process itself draws on motivational 
resources by taking some time and cognitive effort. Hence, an achievement 
goal is likely to draw upon motivational rather than cognitive resources.  
Accordingly, the actual amount of motivational resources spent is the 
other determinant of cognitive effort expenditure for better learning and task 
performance. Only motivated learners devote the available capacity to the 
additional cognitive processing that is germane to learning (Schnotz et al., 
2009). “When learners lack motivation they may fail to engage in generative 
processing even when cognitive capacity is available” (Moreno & Mayer, 
2007, p. 315).  
However, the failure or impaired performance may also be the source 
rather than the result of investment decline (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). 
Roets, Van Hiel, and Kruglanski (2013) showed that the unavailable or 
depleted cognitive capacity activates aversive feelings, which, in turn, 
substantially decrease motivation for task performance (i.e., indicating the 
causal effect of depleted cognitive capacity on motivation). Learners can 
maintain task performance, particularly under situational stressors (e.g., time 
pressure or noise), as long as they adequately have both motivation and 
cognitive capacity (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). These findings indicate that 
when both motivation and cognitive capacity are low, learners may engage 
in unconscious processing of task-irrelevant information; conversely, when 
both are high, learners attend to task-relevant information. As for when 
motivation for processing additional information is high but available 
cognitive capacity is low, learning can be inhibited rather than facilitated, 
because the inadequate capacity does not allow learners to properly perceive 
even task-relevant information as useful for learning and task performance 
(Kuldas et al., 2014b). Hence, an instructional intervention must be aimed at 
the optimisation of both cognitive load and the exertion of cognitive effort 
(i.e., optimising the interaction between motivation and cognitive capacity).  
The abovementioned findings substantiate the “Integrative Process 
Approach” proposed by Roets and Van Hiel (2011a). This approach 
provides new insights into the dynamic interplay between learners’ affect, 
motivation, and cognitive capacity, which are “the most proximal process 
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variables directly affecting information processing” (Roets & Van Hiel, 
2011a, p. 510). This dynamic/causal interplay determines both qualitative 
and quantitative values of information processing. To show how the 
interaction between cognitive capacity, affect, and motivation could be 
optimised (i.e., increasing motivation as long as cognitive capacity is 
available or adequate for deliberate processing task-related information), 
further research could apply the integrative process approach to instructional 
interventions. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This review has reconsidered the main concern of Cognitive Load Theory 
over the issue of how to optimise learners’ use of working memory capacity. 
The review has aimed at explicating the need to investigate the role of 
unconscious processes, including emotional/motivational factors, in learning 
and performance of a cognitive task. The reviewed literature suggests that 
the use of working memory is determined not only by learners’ expertise 
levels, but also by their emotional/motivational states. An instructional 
format would encourage learners to use the available capacity to perform 
and learn their task better, provided that the design is aligned with the 
emotional/motivational factors. This alignment would help educators predict 
whether providing learners with more or less information facilitates rather 
than inhibits learning. Educators also need further clarification on how an 
instructional design can be aligned with learners’ motivational factors, to 
stimulate them to use their cognitive capacity for better learning.  
The theory claims validity for the conscious construction of knowledge, 
the kinds of learning requiring conscious effort to take place in long-term 
memory. Traditionally, the theory does not concern itself with the 
unconscious construction of knowledge or the unconscious influence of 
motivational factors. The theory thereby deprives both learners and 
educators of what the unconscious processing can contribute to the learning 
and teaching activities, and whether it impedes or facilitates cognitive 
learning and task performance. This review suggests that the theory can be 
more effectively applied to instructional designs, provided that it takes the 
unconscious nature of human cognitive and emotional information-
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processing systems into account. The theory would thus predict what effects 
different emotional/motivational factors will have on the investment of 
cognitive effort. The framework of the cognitive load theory would be 
comprehensive with the integrative process approach to instructional 
designs, and thus, would provide new insights into the interaction between 
working memory capacity, affect, and motivation, in particular how this 
interaction could be optimised (i.e., increasing motivation under adequate 
cognitive capacity).  
Further studies are needed to explain the relation between the investment 
of cognitive effort and the motivational factors to provide new insights into the 
following questions: (a) To what extent can learners consciously mediate their 
motivational factors (e.g., interest, beliefs, desires, or goals) to perform a 
cognitive learning task? (b) Do learners invest different amounts of cognitive 
effort in the task when they are consciously motivated and otherwise? (c) To 
what extent do learners’ avoided thoughts (e.g., failure expectation) or 
undesirable experiences (e.g., past unsuccessful achievements) determine the 
investment of cognitive effort; for instance, whether or not learners’ fear of 
failure highly affects the investment? Prospective studies could also provide 
more empirical evidence for whether or not the emotional load (i.e., task-
irrelevant thoughts associated with negative emotions) is an additional 
cognitive load distinguished from the intrinsic and extraneous load.  
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